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Overview
The Allahabad High Court has set aside a 2019 conviction under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), acquitting a man who had remained in custody for more than nine years. A Division Bench found that the initial written report was silent on the sexual-assault allegation, that the child witness’s account showed inconsistencies as the case progressed, and that the medical evidence on record did not corroborate the prosecution’s version.
- Case: Kuntesh v. State of U.P.
- Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 328 — Neutral Citation 2026:AHC:124831-DB
- Bench: Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay
- Date: Reported 22–23 June 2026 (LiveLaw, 22 June 2026; Verdictum, 23 June 2026)
Facts
The prosecution’s case traced back to an incident in 2017. According to the written report, the informant’s minor daughter had gone to a nearby shop to buy some items. While returning home, and passing near the accused’s residence, she was allegedly caught by the throat, causing her to fall and lose consciousness. On this written report, the police registered a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) and Section 354-B (assault with intent to disrobe) of the IPC, along with Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act (sexual assault and its punishment). The initial report did not contain any allegation of penetrative sexual assault.
During investigation, the victim’s statement was recorded before a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was on the strength of this statement that an offence under Section 376 IPC (rape) came to be added to the case. Since the matter was exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, it was committed to trial, and the accused was tried and convicted for offences under Sections 323 and 376 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act (penetrative sexual assault). The conviction, along with a sentence of life imprisonment, was pronounced by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Auraiya.
The accused, who had been unable to secure bail, remained in custody through the trial and the pendency of his appeal — a period exceeding nine years — before the High Court took up the matter.
What the Court Held
1. The initial report was silent on the sexual-assault allegation. The Bench noted that the written report on which the FIR was registered, and which the victim’s father had lodged, made no mention of any sexual assault. The FIR invoked only Section 323 and Section 354-B IPC together with Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act — provisions addressing hurt and assault, not penetrative sexual assault. The allegation of rape surfaced only later, at the stage of the victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement.
2. The father’s trial testimony did not support the escalated version. The informant — the victim’s father — deposed before the trial court but confined his testimony to what he had stated in the original written complaint. He did not, at any stage of his deposition, speak to the commission of rape. He clarified that he had only narrated to the police what his daughter had told him, and had no personal knowledge of the incident himself. The Court observed that “this material omission at the earliest opportunity casts a heavy shadow of doubt on the genesis of the prosecution’s case.”
3. The child witness’s account showed inconsistencies. The Bench recorded that it found inconsistencies and improvements in the statements of the victim, who was eight years old at the time of the incident, as her account moved from the original complaint through to her deposition at trial.
4. Medical evidence did not corroborate the allegation. The Court held that the medical findings on record failed to conclusively establish, or medically corroborate, the allegation of sexual assault. It specifically noted “no internal and external injuries, intact hymen and complete absence of seminal fluids,” observing that these findings, considered along with the other circumstances of the case, cast a shadow of doubt on the prosecution’s case.
5. Quality of evidence over quantity, but a child witness calls for circumspection. Addressing the standard applicable to a conviction resting substantially on a child witness’s sole testimony, the Bench explained: “In evaluating this matter, two core principles of the Indian Evidence Act must be applied. First, under Section 134, the law prioritizes the quality of evidence over its quantity, establishing that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove any fact, meaning a conviction can legally rest on a single, wholly credible witness. Second, under Section 118, a child is recognized as a competent witness provided they possess the capacity to understand the questions put to them and give rational answers, remaining unhindered by their tender years. It is a well-settled principle of law that while a conviction can be based on the sole testimony of a child witness, such evidence must be evaluated with great circumspection.”
6. Benefit of the doubt to the accused; appeal allowed. Weighing the silence in the initial report, the father’s testimony, the inconsistencies in the victim’s account, and the absence of medical corroboration together, the Bench held that the prosecution had not established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court, and acquitted the appellant of the offences under Sections 323 and 376 IPC and the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act. The accused, who had spent over nine years in jail since his arrest, was directed to be released from custody forthwith.
Precedents Relied On
Verdictum’s report of the judgment records the Bench invoking Section 134 and Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — the applicable evidence statute here, since the trial concluded in 2019, well before the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 came into force. The Bench’s caution that a child witness’s testimony, though legally sufficient on its own, must be evaluated “with great circumspection” reflects a settled line of Supreme Court authority on child witnesses — most notably Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177, where the Supreme Court held that a child is a competent witness if capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers, but that courts must satisfy themselves against the possibility of tutoring before convicting on such evidence.
Secondary reporting on this case has also framed the Bench’s inquiry around whether the victim’s testimony met the Supreme Court’s “sterling witness” standard — the benchmark for testing whether a solitary, uncorroborated account can sustain a conviction on its own, a standard traced to Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21. That framing is consistent with the Bench’s own emphasis, recorded in the judgment itself, on evaluating a child witness’s account with heightened care rather than accepting it at face value merely because corroboration is not strictly mandatory.
Takeaway
The acquittal in Kuntesh v. State of U.P. did not turn on a rejection of the child witness’s competence — the Bench reaffirmed that a child’s testimony can, in principle, sustain a conviction by itself. It turned instead on the cumulative weight of specific evidentiary gaps: an initial report that said nothing about sexual assault, an informant whose deposition did not go beyond his written complaint, an account that changed as the case progressed, and medical findings that did not corroborate the allegation. Taken together, these gaps meant the prosecution’s version could not be said to be free of reasonable doubt.
The case is also a reminder of the human cost that can attach to a prolonged trial-and-appeal process — the appellant spent more than nine years in custody before an evidentiary review at the appellate stage led to his acquittal. Neither circumstance — the reversal of a serious conviction, or the length of the underlying incarceration — detracts from the other; the judgment records both as part of the same record.
Useful Resources
- LiveLaw — Allahabad HC Acquits Rape Accused Who Spent 9 Yrs In Jail; Cites Inconsistencies In Child Victim’s Testimony, No Medical Evidence
- Verdictum — Kuntesh v. State of UP (2026:AHC:124831-DB): Section 134 of Evidence Act Prioritizes Quality Over Quantity
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — India Code
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — India Code
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