Right to Be Forgotten and Destruction of Juvenile Records — Section 24(2) JJ Act 2015 and Rule 14 Model Rules Explained

This article is for educational and legal awareness purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice or solicitation. Please consult a qualified advocate for advice on specific legal matters.

Overview

A child who comes into conflict with the law and is dealt with under the juvenile justice system is not meant to carry that record into adult life. Indian law gives this idea a specific statutory shape: the record of the proceeding must eventually be destroyed, and no disqualification attached to the finding of an offence can be visited on the person once they are an adult. This is often described, loosely, as a “right to be forgotten” for juveniles — though the phrase is judicial shorthand for a set of concrete statutory obligations, not a free-standing constitutional guarantee.

This article explains the statutory framework — Section 24 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act 2015) and Rule 14 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 (the Model Rules) — and the line of authority applying it, including the Supreme Court’s articulation of the “principle of fresh start” and a 2025 Rajasthan High Court ruling on destruction of records. It is a distinct doctrinal explainer; it does not summarise any single reported judgment on these facts.

Statutory Framework — Section 24, JJ Act 2015

Section 24 is titled “Removal of disqualification on findings of an offence” and has two operative limbs.

Section 24(1) — Removal of Disqualification

Section 24(1) provides, in substance, that a child who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to a conviction of an offence under the relevant law. The provision opens with a non obstante clause — “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force” — so it overrides disqualification clauses that might otherwise exist in service rules, licensing statutes, or other special laws.

The proviso to Section 24(1) carves out one category: it does not extend to a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years and has been found to be in conflict with law by the Children’s Court under Section 19(1)(i) of the Act — that is, a child in the 16–18 age bracket tried as an adult for a heinous offence and found guilty by the Children’s Court. For that category, the ordinary protection of Section 24(1) does not apply.

Section 24(2) — Destruction of Records

Section 24(2) requires the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), or the Children’s Court in respect of its own registry, to direct the police or the registry that the relevant records of the conviction be destroyed after the expiry of the period of appeal, or after such other reasonable period as may be prescribed. The sub-section leaves the length of that “reasonable period” to delegated legislation — which is where Rule 14 of the Model Rules comes in.

Rule 14, Model Rules 2016 — Fixing the Period

Rule 14 supplies the period Section 24(2) leaves open. It provides that records of conviction of a child in conflict with law are to be kept in safe custody until the expiry of the period of appeal, or for a period of seven years, and no longer, and are thereafter to be destroyed by the person-in-charge of the institution, the Board, or the Children’s Court, as the case may be. Rule 14 carries the same carve-out as the statute: where the offence is heinous and the child was found in conflict with law under Section 19(1)(i) — the 16–18, tried-as-adult category — the records are retained by the Children’s Court rather than destroyed.

Read together, Section 24(2) and Rule 14 impose a positive obligation on the Board and the police to destroy the record — it is not merely an entitlement the former juvenile must apply for, though in practice a representation is often the trigger that brings the obligation to the authority’s notice.

Section 74 of the JJ Act 2015 separately prohibits disclosure of the identity of a child in conflict with law — in reports, in the media, and notably for “the purpose of character certificate or otherwise” in cases pending or disposed of. Section 74 and Section 24 work together but are not the same provision: Section 24 mandates destruction of the record itself; Section 74 bars disclosure of the child’s identity even where a record legitimately exists. An adverse police-verification report that draws on juvenile-era material implicates both.

The “Principle of Fresh Start” — Section 3(xiv)

The doctrinal root of these provisions is stated expressly in Section 3 of the JJ Act 2015, which lists the general principles to guide the Central Government, State Governments, the Board, and other authorities in implementing the Act. Clause (xiv) states the “Principle of fresh start”: all past records of any child under the juvenile justice system are to be erased, except in special circumstances. Section 24 and Rule 14 are the operative machinery that gives this principle effect — they translate a stated legislative philosophy into a destruction timeline and a bar on disqualification.

Judicial Application

Union of India v. Ramesh Bishnoi (Supreme Court, 2019)

In Union of India v. Ramesh Bishnoi, Civil Appeal No. 9109 of 2019, the Supreme Court considered a case where a candidate selected for the post of Sub-Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force had, on the recruitment questionnaire, disclosed an FIR registered against him under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — offences alleged to have been committed while he was a minor. He had been acquitted after the complainant did not depose against him. The Standing Screening Committee nonetheless found him unsuitable on the basis of the past criminal case, and his appointment was cancelled.

The Supreme Court, per Vineet Saran, J., held that even if the allegations had been true and had resulted in a conviction, that could not have been held against him for employment, because he was a minor at the time of the alleged offence. The Court invoked Section 3(xiv) directly, quoting the “Principle of fresh start” and holding that the object of the JJ Act 2000 and the JJ Act 2015 alike is that a juvenile’s past record should be obliterated, so that no stigma attaches and the person can be reintegrated into society as a normal adult, without any special circumstance applying to displace that principle on the facts. The appeal was dismissed and reinstatement upheld.

Suresh Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (Rajasthan High Court, 2025)

In Suresh Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., 2025:RJ-JP:6012, a constable with the Indo-Tibetan Border Police was dismissed for not disclosing a juvenile-era case in which the Juvenile Justice Board had released him on admonition after counselling. The Rajasthan High Court, per Anoop Kumar Dhand, J., held that where the benefit of Section 24 has been extended to a person, the “right to be forgotten” by removal or destruction of the record of juvenile delinquency is an absolute right, and that the State and other authorities falling within Article 12 of the Constitution of India are restrained from seeking such information from the former juvenile in future. The Court found that the disclosure of the record during verification breached this protection, quashed the termination order, and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.

Read together, the two decisions establish the same principle from different statutory angles: Ramesh Bishnoi applies Section 3(xiv) to bar reliance on the underlying conduct for a disqualification decision, while Suresh Kumar applies Section 24 and Rule 14 to bar the State from even seeking or relying on a record that ought to have been destroyed.

Practical Points

Section 24(2) and Rule 14 impose a duty on the Board/Children’s Court, not merely a right the individual must invoke — but a written representation citing these provisions is the practical first step where an old juvenile record continues to surface in verification.
The seven-year outer limit in Rule 14 runs from the relevant point after the appeal period; records may be destroyed earlier where the appeal period has already expired, but not retained beyond seven years except under the heinous-offence proviso.
Section 74 is a separate ground of objection where identity or record details are disclosed in a character certificate or verification report, independent of whether destruction under Section 24(2) has formally occurred.
The proviso is a real limit. A child aged 16 to 18, tried as an adult by the Children’s Court for a heinous offence and found guilty, does not get the benefit of either Section 24(1) or Section 24(2); the record is retained and the disqualification may continue.
Where an authority relies on a record that should have been destroyed or discloses a juvenile-era matter in breach of Section 74, a representation followed by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the available remedy, as illustrated in Suresh Kumar.

Takeaway

Section 24 of the JJ Act 2015 does two distinct things: sub-section (1) removes the legal disqualification that would otherwise attach to a conviction recorded against a juvenile, and sub-section (2) mandates destruction of the underlying record, with Rule 14 of the Model Rules fixing the outer limit at seven years (subject to the heinous-offence proviso). Both provisions trace back to the “principle of fresh start” in Section 3(xiv) — that a child’s past under the juvenile justice system is to be erased, not carried forward as a permanent civil disability. The Supreme Court’s application of that principle in Ramesh Bishnoi and the Rajasthan High Court’s characterisation of the right as “absolute” in Suresh Kumar show the doctrine operating consistently across different fact patterns — recruitment screening and post-appointment verification — and across different levels of the court hierarchy.

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